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Abstract
Secure two-party computation problem is about two parties that want to compute some
function of their private inputs in a way that other party won’t learn it. We describe a
general way to perform secure two-party computation of a function specified as a boolean
circuit, which was proposed by A.A. Yao in 1982. This method is named Yao garbled
circuit evaluation and is secure against semi-honest adversaries. We present a new efficient
protocol for secure two-party computation Circus, that is secure against malicious adversary
in consistency model. Consistency model implies that either both parties will receive correct
output and persist privacy of their inputs or a honest party will know, that is was cheated
and that adversary potentially have learnt 1 bit of other party’s input value. We specify
all necessary sub-protocols and their security requirements and prove security of Circus in
malicious environment.
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Introduction
Digital circuits power all computations in the world. Every processor chip relies on them. Math-
ematical analog of digital circuit is boolean circuit which operates not on existence of electrical
power, but on logical values. Generally speaking boolean circuits are powerful model and very
interesting area of research about computations. On the other hand, all modern computations
are distributed and usually more than one party are involved. We combine our data to pro-
duce new results, but in the same time we put our privacy on the risk. Modern society bothers
about information being private very much. So computations should be as secure as possible. In
general problem of secure computations is widely known and a lot of research has been done to
discover possibilities to compute while preserving privacy of own data. General ways to do that
were known since 1982, when A.C.C.Yao proposed [1] way how to use boolean circuits to guard
computation against adversary who will behave honestly, but investigate information available
to find other parties inputs. However, if we allow adversary to behave at its own will, Yao’s
solution does not guarantee security. Later there were many attempts to improve this result and
several protocols that are secure against adversary with any behavior derived. Those techniques
are not only very computationally intense and require much time and computational power, but
also it is not trivial to prove that using them preserves security.
In year 2006, Mohassel and Franklin proposed another extension to originals Yao solution and
described protocol that could be secure and more efficient. However, they did not give full proof
of security of proposed construction in their paper [2]. In this thesis, we describe in details
protocol proposed by them, compare it to other existing solutions and give full proof that it is
secure. Additionally, we describe and partially created implementation of this protocol for the
Sharemind platform and give some basic overview of its performance and how much it can be
improved. In the next chapter, we describe necessary concepts and primitives to construct secure
protocol and then transition to defining protocol flow and proving that it is secure.
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1 Preliminaries
Cryptographic protocols are complex interactive computations that satisfy some security require-
ments and have desired security properties. Usually, to discuss security of a protocol quantita-
tively, a notion of adversary’s advantage against the protocol is used. Advantage characterizes
probability that given adversary succeeds at a certain attack. It would be very difficult to analyze
even midsize protocol in detail, for example, prove that some security property holds for every
possible adversary, unless we somehow abstract ourselves from low level implementation details.
Common way to decrease complexity of proofs is to use well defined cryptographic primitives
with given security properties as a black box functionality placeholders [3]. In this case, we split
complexity of the proof into having a real world implementation of the primitive and mathe-
matical proof that a protocol using this primitive is secure (satisfies needed properties). This
chapter describes concepts and cryptographic primitives that we need to construct protocols for
multiparty computation.
1.1 Time complexity
Time complexity of a computation describes how much time it takes to finish the computation.
One obvious way to quantify time complexity is to define it in terms of number of elementary
operations needed for the computation. This approach is not very usable, cause usually the
number of operation is hard to determine exactly and it what is more important it is different for
different input sizes. Thus, usually when someone speaks about time complexity they want to
asymptotically describe time behavior of a functions as size of its input goes to infinity. This is
comfortable way to define time complexity, but it not suitable for our needs. When we construct
a cryptographic primitive we assume that solving a specific problem takes a specific number of
elementary operations and conclude that those operations will take certain amount of real world
time. Our operations have a fixed input size: key length, length of a number, etc - so we do
not care about what could be function complexity on near-infinity sized inputs. Additionally,
asymptotic notations tend to hide a constant factors, which can result in orders size difference
between expected time and real-world time. We need to define some natural ordering of functions
based on their time complexity. So if we have some threshold t in number of elementary operations
that can be computed under time t, we can divide all functions with sizes of their inputs in two
groups, those that can be computed in less than t and those which cannot. In this thesis, we
mainly use only this aspect of time complexity that given a threshold t some functions cannot
be computed under time t. When we talk on a higher level of abstraction than a single function
computation it’s not always comfortable to specify this time constraint for every function. So we
say that a party is t-time if it can compute functions whose time complexity is not greater than
t. Note that this t-time is a bound on a total time of party’s computation, so it cannot compute
multiple t-time functions in parallel still being a t-time party.
Time complexity is a very convenient way to bound power of dishonest parties. We say that if
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a party that does not follow a protocol or tries to obtain some knowledge it is not supposed to
and it can compute functions which time complexity is not bigger than t is a t-time adversary.
1.2 Boolean circuit computation
Boolean function is a predicate, in other words, it is a function that takes some 1 bit values and
returns 1 bit. Basic boolean functions are not (¬), and (∧), or (∨), xor (⊕), eq (⇔), symbols
show their mathematical notations. Boolean function can be presented as a table every row of
which contains information about what is an output of the function for given argument values.
Such a table is called a truth table of a boolean (logical) function. For example following is the
truth table for and function.
α β α ∧ β
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
Table 1: Boolean and truth table
Combination of boolean functions is obviously also a boolean function. This fact is used to
combine several basic functions into a greater one. We just join outputs of one function to inputs
of another one, this allows us specify more sophisticated functions. Boolean circuit computation
is a way to specify computations that uses directed graphs to represent a combination of boolean
functions. Nodes of this graph are called gates and represent simple boolean functions (like and
or xor). Edges, also known as wires, in case of circuit computation can hold 1 bit value. It is
very similar how a hardware computations go, there are electrical wires that at every point of
time can either have a current or not. And a physical analogue of a gate is a computation unit
that sets current on outgoing electrical wires depending on an input wires current. So as in a
physical device incoming edges for every node in the graph correspond to input values to the
function of the gate. Outgoing edges will hold output of the function after computation.
To compute the circuit one needs to evaluate every gate’s value. Consider the following full
adder circuit as present in the Figure 1 below.
Circuit’s inputs are bits A and B, Cin is a curry bit if it exists (if there were previous addi-
tions), outputs are S which will hold bit value of (A + B) mod 2, and an output curry bit to
propagate addition further Cout. Suppose we know values of A, B, and Cin. Then to evaluate a
circuit we are evaluating its gates one by one. At each step, we evaluate one gate which inputs
are known, so for the example above we cannot evaluate or right away. But we could evaluate
gates in this concrete example in a left to right fashion. Evaluation goes straightforwardly, we
have a gate g and all its input wires contain bit values. If they does not one needs first to
7
Figure 1: Full adder digital circuit [4]
evaluate gate that has wire with no value as an outgoing one. This evaluation sets bit values to
all outgoing wires of this gate according by gate’s truth table.
Boolean circuit is a very powerful computation model, for example we can do randomised com-
putation with it. All we need is just specify some input wires that will hold presampled random
bit values. We can obviously construct circuits for deterministic functions also. For instance we
will show how to construct circuit to compute greater than function: gt(α, β) = α > β, where α
and β are 32-bit integers. We name α and β bits by index, α0 is least significant bit of α and
α32 refers to a most significant bit of α. We will use following gates: and, or, eq and not - all of
them in their straightforward logical way. Gate and is true if both arguments are true, or is one
of arguments is true, eq if both arguments are of the same value, not inverts input bit.
First, we define 32 equality gates. Let eqi = αi ⇔ βi, for all i in {0, . . . , 31}. Note that
already here we can define f(α, β) = α = β as and of all eqi gates. But gt is more interesting.
Now α is greater than β if for any bit i: αi > βi and ∀j ∈ [i+ 1; 31] αj = βj . This fact allows us
to construct bit-gt gates in a very straightforward manner. We start with 31-th and 30-th bits:
gt31 = α31 ∧ ¬β31
gt30 = eq31 ∧ α30 ∧ ¬β30
Now we need to introduce more gates which will accumulate boolean value if bits greater than
given index are equal in both input values.
u30 = eq31 ∧ eq30
And in general:
ui = eqi ∧ ui+1
Now we can proceed with bit-gt gates that are left:
gti = ui+1 ∧ αi ∧ ¬βi
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Now we have values if α is greater than β because of any i-th bit, so we just or all these
values to obtain the result. In the same way, we can construct function less than lt .
Note that there are two obvious ways how to estimate the time complexity of a boolean
circuit. We can define a total time to compute a circuit as a number of gates.
ttotal = |C|, where C is a set of all gates of a circuit.
If we allow parallelization of computations then a circuit can generally be computed faster
than in a number-of-gates time, so minimal time to compute a circuit depends on a depth of the
circuit, cause all gates on a single level can be computed simultaneously:
tminimal = depth(C) where depth(C) is depth of the circuit.
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2 Cryptographic tools
2.1 Pseudorandom generators and functions
Random in common sense means unpredictable. So, say that we want to have random string
x which is n bits long. The most unpredictable way to get this string is to uniformly sample
set {0, 1}n. If n is fairly large it is very hard to get n bits with enough entropy. So we use
a pseudorandom generators and functions to emulate source of randomness. They are pseudo-
random because they produces result that is difficult to predict. Pseudorandom generator is
a deterministic function that takes seed s of size m (which is small comparing to size of the
output) and stretches that to a hard to predict output of the size n. Formally it is defined as
f : S → X , where S is a seed space and X is a stretched output space. A security requirements
for a pseudorandom generator f is that its output must be unpredictable, i.e., indistinguishable
from a random sampling. Let’s define games that describe this behavior for a pseudorandom
generator f on Figure 2.
GA0[
x←−
u
{0, 1}n
return A(x)
GA1[
s←−
u
{0, 1}m
return A(f(s))
Figure 2: Pseudorandom generator indistinguishability games
In those games, an adversary A is trying to guess index of the game it is playing. So now we
can define security of pseudorandom generator in terms of advantage of adversary A.
AdvPRGf (A) = |Pr[GA0 = 1]− Pr[GA1 = 1]|
A function f is (t, ε)-pseudorandom generator if for all t-time adversaries A advantage
AdvPRG(A) is less or equal to ε.
As real life candidates for pseudorandom generator we can mention modified version of syn-
chronous stream cipher SNOW2.0 [5]. For instance, time complexity of algebraic attacks against
modified SNOW2.0 is about 21292 operations. However, no precise estimates for (t, ε) pairs are
known and cannot be known without extensive breakthrough in complexity theory.
A pseudorandom generator is a deterministic function from cartesian product of key space
and message space to a ciphertext space: f : K ×M → C. Usually we want to run a function
many times so key part of the argument space can be fixed and referred implicitly as function
index, thus if for instance we fix a key k, pseudorandom function f will be referred as fk :M→ C.
Now, let Fall be a set of all functions f : K ×M→ C. Then we can define a function family
F ⊆ Fall as a multiset of functions F = {fk : k ∈ K} with fixed key part k. Note that it is a
multiset, cause there could exist k1 and k2 such that k1 6= k2, but fk1 ≡ fk2 . Let us design two
games similarly to games for pseudorandom generator, see Figure 3.
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GA0
f ←−
u
Fall
for i ∈ {1, q} :[
yi ← f(xi)
return A(y)
GA1
k ←−
u
K
for i ∈ {1, q} :[
yi ← f(k, xi)
return A(y)
Figure 3: Cryptographic games to define pseudorandom function family
Similarly as before with pseudorandom generator, adversary is trying to guess which game is
it playing so its advantage is defined in a similar way
AdvPRFf (A) = |Pr[GA0 = 1]− Pr[GA1 = 1]|.
A function family F is (t, ε)-pseudorandom function family if for all t-time adversaries A
advantage AdvPRF (A) is less or equal to ε.
Pseudorandom permutation is defined similarly, but through families of permutations. Let
Fprm be a set of all permutations f : K ×M→M, and let P ⊆ Fprm be a permutation family.
We define pseudorandom permutation games in a similar manner as distinguishing pseudo-
random function games above. The differences are only that in game GA0 we sample a function
not from set of all function, but from a set of all permutations Fprm. Advantage is defined in
exactly the same way as with pseudorandom functions
AdvPRPf (A) = |Pr[GA0 = 1]− Pr[GA1 = 1]|.
A permutation family P is (t, ε)-pseudorandom perumation family if for all t-time adversaries
A advantage AdvPRP (A) is less or equal to ε.
Now when we have defined those primitives, let us specify what could be a real life candidates
for them. For instance block ciphers are usually candidates of pseudorandom permutations
by design. Specifically we are interested in AES (Rijndael) cipher which is a pseudorandom
permutation family, where we sample a specific function by providing a key to AES.
2.2 Array encryption
Usually encryption scheme are used to encrypt messages, so encryption enc and decryption dec
are defined to operate on the following domains:
enc : K ×M −→ C ,
dec : K × C −→M ,
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where K, M and C are respectively key, message and ciphertext spaces. To simplify matters in
this thesis, we need a modified definition of encryption scheme, as we need to encrypt tables and
arrays so the single cell can be revealed by revealing keys. Assume we have the following setup
of four element array arranged in a table, see Figure 4.
Figure 4: Array encryption table
We have four key values and four messages arranged in the table. Now, we need array
encryption scheme to use two different keys to perform encryption (decryption) operation on
each message. To accommodate this fact we modify domains of encryption scheme:
enc : K ×K ×M −→ C ,
dec : K ×K × C −→M .
Notion enckx,ky (m) = c means, that message m is encrypted using keys kx and ky to produce
ciphertext c. Decryption operation keys are notioned in the same manner as indexes, not argu-
ments of the operation: deckx,ky (c) = m.
Let us now define a notion for the whole table encryption. Let m = (m00,m01,m10,m11), then
the following formula describes one of the options how to organize array encryption operation
AEk0x,k1x,k0y,k1y (m) =
(
enck0x,k0y (m00) enck0x,k1y (m01)
enck1x,k0y (m10) enck1x,k1y (m11)
)
.
Note, that opposite to encryption we want decryption operation being called on each cell
explicitly. More specifically, security requirement for such array encryption scheme is that ad-
versary which has two keys, one from each pairs k0x, k
1
x and k
0
y, k
1
y, should be able to decrypt
only one cell. This desired property of encryption scheme is to be secure under chosen plaintext
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attacks, so now we define formal games for IND-CPA setting, see Figure 5.
GA0
k0x, k
1
x ← K×K
k0y, k
1
y ← K×K
m0,m1, bx, by ← A
if m0[bx][by] 6= m1[bx][by] then return ⊥
c0 ← AEk0x,k1x,k0y,k1y (m0)
c1 ← AEk0x,k1x,k0y,k1y (m1)
return A(c0, kbxx , kbyy )
GA1
k0x, k
1
x ← K×K
k0y, k
1
y ← K×K
m0,m1, bx, by ← A
if m0[bx][by] 6= m1[bx][by] then return ⊥
c0 ← AEk0x,k1x,k0y,k1y (m0)
c1 ← AEk0x,k1x,k0y,k1y (m1)
return A(c1, kbxx , kbyy )
Figure 5: Array encryption IND-CPA games
Advantage of an adversary defined as usual as the following difference:
AdvIND−CPAAE (A) = |Pr[GA0 = 1]− Pr[GA1 = 1]|.
An encryption scheme is (t, ε)-array encryption IND-CPA secure if for all t-time adversaries A
advantage AdvIND−CPAAE (A) is less or equal to ε.
To build one-time pad array encryption scheme we need 2` bit long keys to encrypt four
element array with ` bit long messages. Namely, we can split each key k into ` bit long blocks
and use these blocks sequentially when we need to encrypt message with key k. To get rid of
the restriction on key length we use pseudorandom generator to stretch keys upto necessary
length. If keys are not long enough, we use pseudorandom generator f to stretch them upto
needed length. The result is given in Protocol 1. For clarity, let f : K →M×M, particularly
f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}` × {0, 1}` and let f(x)[0] denote the first component of f(x) and f(x)[1] the
second component.
Input: k0x, k
1
x, k
0
y, k
1
y and message m = (m00,m01,m10,m11).
Output: ciphertext c = (c00, c01, c10, c11)
1. Compute c00 = m00 ⊕ f(k0x)[0]⊕ f(k0y)[0].
2. Compute c01 = m01 ⊕ f(k0x)[1]⊕ f(k1y)[0].
3. Compute c10 = m10 ⊕ f(k1x)[0]⊕ f(k0y)[1].
4. Compute c11 = m11 ⊕ f(k1x)[1]⊕ f(k1y)[1].
Protocol 1: Array encryption scheme using pseudorandom generator for one-time-pad AEf
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Lemma 1. If generator used to stretch keys for array encryption scheme is (t, ε)-pseudorandom
generator, one-time pad xor array encryption scheme is (t, 8 · ε)-IND-CPA indistinguishable.
Proof. (Sketch) Protocol 2 describes ideal functionality for array encryption AE◦.
Input: message m = (m00,m01,m10,m11)
Output: ciphertext c = (c00, c01, c10, c11)
1. If not provided, generate keys k0x ← {0, 1}2` , k1x ← {0, 1}2` , k0y ← {0, 1}2` , k1y ← {0, 1}2`.
2. Compute c00 = m00 ⊕ k0x[0]⊕ k0y[0].
3. Compute c01 = m01 ⊕ k0x[1]⊕ k1y[0].
4. Compute c10 = m10 ⊕ k1x[0]⊕ k0y[1].
5. Compute c11 = m11 ⊕ k1x[1]⊕ k1y[1].
Protocol 2: Ideal array encryption scheme AE◦
Remember, that advantage of the adversary A is defined in terms of winning games described
in Figure 5. Consider then, following intermediate games given on Figure 6.
GA2
k0x, k
1
x ←M×M×M×M
k0y, k
1
y ←M×M×M×M
m0,m1, bx, by ← A
if m0[bx][by] 6= m1[bx][by] then return ⊥
c0 ← AE◦k0x,k1x,k0y,k1y (m0)
c1 ← AE◦k0x,k1x,k0y,k1y (m1)
return A(c0, kbxx , kbyy )
GA3
k0x, k
1
x ←M×M×M×M
k0y, k
1
y ←M×M×M×M
m0,m1, bx, by ← A
if m0[bx][by] 6= m1[bx][by] then return ⊥
c0 ← AE◦k0x,k1x,k0y,k1y (m0)
c1 ← AE◦k0x,k1x,k0y,k1y (m1)
return A(c1, kbxx , kbyy )
Figure 6: Array encryption IND-CPA games with random number generator
As AE◦ uses uniformly sampled keys, so messages of the tables are xor-ed with random
bit-strings, which results in ciphertext being uniformly sampled from all possible ciphertexts.
Thus, these games are perfectly indistinguishable from each other, which means that there is no
adversary that can distinguish which of these games is it playing with significant certainty.
Let’s investigate what is the computational distance between games GA0 and GA2 . The only sig-
nificant difference in their description is that encryption is performed in GA0 using keys stretched
by pseudorandom generator and for GA2 using uniformly random bit-strings. Essentially, the only
difference is in how c0 is computed (cause adversary does not see c1). Now, in AE
f ciphertext
c0 = F (m0, f(k
0
x), f(k
1
x), f(k
0
y), f(k
1
y)), where f is pseudorandom generator and F is determinis-
tic function, which actually does the same as AEf , but is written explicitly with keys as arguments.
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On the other hand in AE◦ respective ciphertext is computed as c◦0 = F (m0, k¯0x, k¯1x, k¯0y, k¯1y), where
keys are uniformly sampled from M×M space. To derive a computational distance between
these games consider following series of hybrid games, where ciphertext c0 is computed in the
following fashion:
G00 : c0 = F (m0, k¯0x, f(k1x), f(k0y), f(k1y)) ,
G01 : c0 = F (m0, k¯0x, k¯1x, f(k0y), f(k1y)) ,
G02 : c0 = F (m0, k¯0x, k¯1x, k¯0y, f(k1y)) .
Now the distance between GA0 and G00 is clearly ε, as if some adversary A can achieve better
result, we can construct distinguisher BA for PRG games on Figure 2, which achieves the same
success rate as A. This leads to a contradiction with function f being (t, ε)-pseudorandom
generator. B will query PRG game with k0x, then form all necessary input for A by uniformly
sampling three other keys, and return whatever A returns. This strategy obviously gains the
same success, as A in distinguishing GA0 from G00. By similar argument distance between G00
and G01 is ε, distance between G01 and G02 is ε and distance between G02 and GA2 is ε. Thus the
total distance between GA0 and GA2 is 4 · ε.
In the same manner we show that distance between GA1 and GA3 is 4 · ε. Thus, total computa-
tional distance between games GA0 and GA1 is then 8·ε, so encryption scheme is (t, 8·ε)-IND-CPA
indistinguishable.
2.3 Commitment schemes
Commitment scheme is usually a two-phase protocol, which allows a party to send messages to
other party and without instantly revealing their content and later also reveal the content of
messages. Usually, when one party sends message to other, it reveals content of this message
immediately. When using a commitment, this process of sending message becomes actually two-
phase: sending commitment value and then sending decommitment value. This allows sender
to send a message without immediate revealing of message content. Commitment schemes are
widely used in building cryptographic protocols since about 1982, but formally formalized first
by Brassard, Chaum, and Crepeau [6]. First of all, there is a generation procedure Gen(),
which is used to generate a shared parameters pk for a commitment scheme, two main phases of
commitment scheme are: creation Com and opening Open of a commitment. Those are defined
as Compk : R×M→ C ×D and Openpk : C ×D →M, where R is a space of randomness, M is
the message space, C and D are respectively spaces of commitment and decommitment values.
Shared parameters define behavior of the Com and Open procedures, so we usually specify them
not as an argument, but as index, like (c, d) ← Compk(m). In the notation above c is called
commitment value, d is decommitment value, and pk is a shared parameters value that were
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produced by Gen. Commitment scheme is functional iff
∀pk ← Gen(),∀m ∈M : Openpk(Compk(m)) ≡ m.
The fact that there are two values: commitment and decommitment instead of a single
message, is used hide the message from the receiver until decommitment value arrives to him.
Usually, a party that commits to a message m computes (c, d) ← Com(m) and sends c to the
receiver, then at some point of time later it sends d also to the receiver, so the last could verify
the message was Open(c, d).
Now from all properties a commitment scheme can have, we are interested in hiding and
binding. Hiding means that commitment value alone does not provide meaningful information
GA0
pk ← Gen()
(m0,m1)← A(pk)
(c, d)← Compk(m0)
return A(c)
GA1
pk ← Gen()
(m0,m1)← A(pk)
(c, d)← Compk(m1)
return A(c)
Figure 7: Commitment scheme hiding property games
to the verifier. More formally (t, ε)-hiding property of the commitment scheme means that for
any t-time adversary advantage against commitment scheme hiding property games, defined on
Figure 7, is bounded by ε where the advantage is then defined
Advhidingf (A) = |Pr[GA0 = 1]− Pr[GA1 = 1]|.
Binding means that commiter, after publishing a commitment value cannot provide decom-
mitment values that open the commitment to different messages. Formally, it is defined as
probability of adversary to win this binding game (see Figure 8).
GA0
pk ← Gen()
(c, d0, d1)← A(pk)
mi ← Openpk(c, di) for i ∈ {0, 1}
if m0 = ⊥ or m1 = ⊥ then return 0
return [m0 6= m1]
Figure 8: Commitment scheme binding property game
The advantage against binging property is simply defined as probability of the adversary to
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win the binding game
Advbindingf (A) = Pr[GA0 = 1] .
Commitment scheme is (t, ε)-binding if there exist no t-time adversaryA, such that advantage
Advbinding(A) is greater than ε.
2.3.1 Pedersen commitment scheme
Suppose we have a finite cyclic multiplicative algebraic group G. If discrete logarithm problem
in it is hard, then a group is DL-secure. Figure 9 defines the formal security games for discrete
logarithm problem. More specifically it is (t, ε)-DL-secure if no t-time adversary A can gain
GA
x←−
u
G
y = gx
x¯← A(y)
return x
?
= x¯
Figure 9: Discrete logarithm game
advantage AdvDLf (A) = Pr[GA = 1] greater than ε. Which means that adversary cannot correctly
compute discrete logarithm of a random group element with probability more than ε.
Pedersen commitment scheme [7] is set up by choosing G = 〈g〉 a q-element DL-group, where
q is prime. Take y uniformly from G, then (g, y) will be public parameters of the commitment
scheme. To commit to message m ∈ Zq, one needs to choose r ← Zq and compute commitment
value c ← gm · yr and decommitment value d ← (m, r). Pair (m, r) is a valid decommitment
value for commitment c with public parameters pk = (g, y) if c = gm · yr. This construction
gives us following security guarantees for hiding and binding properties. In this thesis we present
only sketch proofs of properties of Pedersen commitment scheme, rigorous mathematical proofs
about them, interested reader can find in Liina Kamm work about classification of commitment
schemes [8].
Theorem 1. If G it (t, ε)-DL-secure group with q elements, where q is a prime, Pedersen
commitment scheme is perfectly hiding and (t, ε)-binding commitment scheme.
Proof. (Sketch) hiding. Following is a valid argument that could be used to construct a straight-
forward proof. Note that yr is uniformly distributed over G, since r is uniformly chosen from Zq,
g is a generator of G and y = gx for some x 6= 0. And as gm ·G = G, so c is uniformly distributed
over G. So there is no way for adversary to determine which hiding game is it playing.
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binding. We can prove binding property by showing that a valid double opening to a Pedersen
commitment will reveal a discrete logarithm of gy (which is random group element), so it is
impossible for (t, ε)-adversary. Suppose (m0, r0) and (m1, r1) are valid decommitment values
for some commitment c = gm · yr, note that they must open to a different values, but:
c = gm0 · yr0 = gm1 · yr1 ⇐⇒ logg(y) = m0 −m1
r0 − r1
As r0 6= r1, adversary who is able to break binding property can compute discrete logarithm. It
contradicts the fact that G is (t, ε)-DL-secure.
2.3.2 Split receipt commitment
For this thesis, we need another type of commitment scheme with peculiar security properties. It
has the same procedures as basic commitment scheme Gen, Com and Open. Generation procedure
Gen as usual produces public parameters. However, Com and Open work on a slightly different
domains
Com : R×M→ C ×D ×D ,
Open : C × D ×D →M .
Important feature of this type of commitment is that it produces two decommitment values for
each commited message. Requirement for this scheme to be functional is the same is usual one
pk ← Gen() ∀m : Open(Com(m)) = m.
Consider values that are produced by Com procedure c, d1, d2 ← Com(m), c is commitment value,
d1 and d2 are respectively first and second decommitment values.
Security requirements for the scheme are then the following. Pairs c, d1 and c, d2 are hiding,
meaning that one cannot learn commited message by observing only one such pair of values.
Formalising this requirement as games we have following game, see Figure 10.
GA0
pk ← Gen()
(m0,m1, r)← A(pk)
(c, d1, d2)← Compk(m0)
return A(c, dr, r)
GA1
pk ← Gen()
(m0,m1, r)← A(pk)
(c, d1, d2)← Compk(m1)
return A(c, dr, r)
Figure 10: Split receipt commitment hiding games
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With corresponding advantage definition, which is as usual
Advs−hid(A) = |Pr[GA0 = 1]− Pr[GA1 = 1]| .
Binding property of split receipt commitment stands in the fact that there should exist no
double opening possibilities if c and one of the decommitment values are fixed. The following
game on Figure 11 formalizes this property.
GA0
pk ← Gen()
(c, d1, dˆ1, d2, dˆ2)← A(pk)
m0 ← Openpk(c, d1, d2)
m1 ← Openpk(c, dˆ1, dˆ2)
if d1 6= dˆ1 ∧ d2 6= dˆ2 then return ⊥
if m0 = ⊥ ∨ m1 = ⊥ then return ⊥
return [m0 6= m1]
Figure 11: Split receipt commitment binding game
Advantage AdvA of adversary A is probability that it will win this game
Advs−bind(A) = Pr[GA0 = 1].
Now, split receipt commitment is (t, ε)-hiding if no t-time adversaryA’s advantage Advs−hidf (A)
is greater than ε. Also, split receipt commitment is (t, ε)-binding if no t-time adversary A’s ad-
vantage Advs−bindf (A) is greater than ε.
Now we describe how to organize a split receipt commitment scheme from a usual commitment
scheme CS such that decommitment value d produced by this commitment scheme is an element
of Abelian group (D,+). Then to perform a split receipt commitment SR-Com operation on
message m, we compute (c, d) ← Com(m), and then additively share d as a pair (d1, d2), where
d1 ← D and d1 + d2 = d.
Lemma 2. If Com is (t, ε)-hiding and (t′, ε′)-binding commitment scheme, decommitment value
of which is an element of Abelian group (D,+), split receipt commitment SR-Com based on it
and additive sharing is (t, ε)-hiding and (t′, ε′)-binding.
Proof. hiding property. We prove hiding property of such split receipt commitment scheme
with a straightforward reduction. If there exist t-time adversary A who gains advantage more
than ε, then we can construct adversary B to break hiding property of underlying commitment
scheme in the following way. Adversary B initializes A and submits messages produced by A to
hiding game. Upon receiving commitment value c, adversary B will generate random d1 ∈ D,
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and return whatever A returns on (c, d1, r). Obviously, advantage of B against underlying com-
mitment hiding is equal to A’s advantage against split receipt commitment hiding game and we
have reached a contradiction.
binding property. Proving binding property of this split receipt commitment scheme is
also straightforward. Adversary, who can provide valid double opening triples (c, d1, d2) and
(c, d1, dˆ2), can double open underlying commitment with pairs (c, d1 + d2) and (c, d1, dˆ2), since
d1 +d2 6= d1 + dˆ2 in case of successful double opening for SR-Com. The similar argument holds if
adversary successfully attacks binding of split receipt commitment with triples that share value
of d2. This implies, that adversary B against Com binding games, that uses A to produce triples
(c, d1, d2) and (c, d1, dˆ2) and returns (c, d1 + d2, d1, dˆ2) will success if A would. And as Com is
(t, ε)-binding A’s advantage against SR-Com binding property is at most ε.
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3 Secure multiparty computation
Consider the following scenario, when we have several parties that have their respective inputs.
They want to compute a function on their inputs, but in the same time they want to do that in
a way so their inputs will not be learned by the other parties.
3.1 Secure two-party computation
Secure two-party computation problem differs from a multiparty computation by the fact, that
there are only two parties involved. Assume that two parties P1 and P2 want to compute function
f(x, y) = (z1, z2) from their respective inputs x and y. They want to compute it in a such way
that P1 receives z1 as the output and P2 the output z2. Privacy requirements state that no
party should learn other’s party input. Other requirements for this computation is correctness,
the output should be from corresponding to the distribution of function f outputs. This setting
is different from a multiparty setting in several ways, most severe is that one of the parties
will always be in a dominant position. Suppose that we have two parties and that they want
to compute some function in a such manner that both parties will receive some output. They
will do it by running a protocol that consists of several messages that should be sent from one
party to another. Pretend that a protocol run consist on sending four messages: α1, β1, α2, β2.
Messages noted as αi are sent from P1 to P2, messages βi in another direction from P2 to P1.
Now after exchanging those messages both parties will learn their outputs. However note, that
the last message β2 does not give any information to P2, so it can learn its output just from
first three messages. That puts it into a dominant position in a sense that P2 can exit from
protocol at a time when it has received all interesting for it information, and P1 still has not.
It can be shown that in any two-party protocol with any number of messages suffers from this
vulnerability [10]. So while investigating a two-party protocol we should have this possibility of
a dominant party to cancel early.
3.2 Security of a two-party computation
Let’s say those parties have their respective inputs x and y, and they want to compute function f ,
in a way that f(x, y) = (z1, z2) and party one, referred as P1 gets z1 as the output and party two
which will be referred as P2 gets output z2. First, we will construct an idealized version of how
can this computation can be organized. Pretend there exists a trusted third party (referred as
T), which is totally honest, does not want to learn parties’ inputs and is trusted by both parties
involved in the computing f . The ideal protocol uses T to collect inputs from the parties, then
T computes (z1, z2) ← f(x, y) and then it sends z1 to a first party and z2 to a second one. To
accommodate the possibility of dominant party to abort computation before other party receives
its output, ideal protocol incorporates a phase when dominant party sends continue/abort signal
to T. It happens after P1 receives its output but before P2 does. Protocol 3 describes this setting,
where P1 is dominant.
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1. T collects inputs from both parties: f and x1 from P1, x2 from P2.
2. T computes (z1, z2)← f(x1, x2)
3. T sends z1 to P1
4. P1 sends a signal to T. It is either halting signal that corresponds to P1’s wish not to
continue protocol run, or continue signal, that allows T to release P2’s output
5. If T received a signal to continue, it sends z to P2. Otherwise P2 receives ⊥.
Protocol 3: Ideal functionality for two-party computation with T
The outcome of such protocol run depends only on inputs that T gets from parties. We
assume that computation goes magically in T, so it is correct and no information is leaked
during computation. Thus, if any attack exist for this ideal functionality, it depends only on
submitting specifically crafted input to T or observing outputs of the computation. Note, that
in any real implementation of the protocol both these steps: submitting inputs and receiving
outputs are present. Thus any attack possible against ideal functionality is achievable against
real protocol, as corrupted party can exploit submitting same input or observe output in the
same way as against real protocol. Thus any real protocol will be less or equally secure as ideal
one. It is important to note, that it is possible that this ideal protocol could offer very little or no
security guarantees at all (we can construct ideal protocol that is totally insecure, for example, in
the sense of privacy of inputs). But then, a real protocol that implements the same functionality
will also be totally insecure, thus offer equal amount of security, which do not contradicts with
point previously stated.
In this thesis an ideal protocols are marked with a circle, like this pi◦, compared to a real
protocol pi. A notion pi1  pi2 means that pi1 is less or equally secure than pi2.
Now we present a general way to proof the security of a protocol. Assume that we have a
protocol pi1 that has some security guaranties (in extreme case no security guarantees, which we
denote as zero or no security case). And we have a protocol pi2 that we want to prove being at
least as secure as pi1. We make an assumption that there is an adversary A that is good against
protocol pi2. Then we show that we can use A to construct an adversary A◦ that is at least as
good against protocol pi1 as A against pi2. Consequently we have shown that we can successfully
attack protocol pi1 if there exist adversary which can successfully attack pi2.
Figure 12 defines formal games to determine if a protocol is secure in a standalone model.
Standalone model implies that there are no pre- or post-processing context around the protocol,
so we just initialize all parties, adversary and run protocol.
Note, that in these games parties inputs φi does not necessary contains only party’s input
to the protocol, it also can contain any auxiliary information that this party can possess before
protocol execution.
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GAREAL
sample : φ1, φ2, φA ← D
init : A(φA), P1(φ1), P2(φ2)
run protocol : pi
collect outputs : ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕA)
return B(ϕ)
GAIDEAL
sample : φ1, φ2, φA ← D
init : A(φA), P1(φ1), P2(φ2)
run ideal protocol : pi◦
collect outputs : ϕ◦ = (ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕA)
return B(ϕ◦)
Figure 12: Standalone security games
Now in these games B is a success evaluation predicate, which evaluates how well adversary
A is doing against some pre-specified attack target against real protocol. If adversary A succeeds
in cheating with larger probability against real protocol than any adversary in the ideal world,
then intuitively there should exist some distinguisher for outputs of these adversaries. Thus, for
existence of reduction A 7−→ A◦ it is important that
∀A ∃A◦∀D : ϕ◦ ≡ ϕ ,
where ≡means indistinguishability of distributions. However, note that mere indistinguishability
is not enough as reduction must be efficient. To be able to prove that protocol is secure, we need
the fact that A◦ running time is not much greater that A time. So we need reduction A 7−→ A◦
by such that execution times of A and A◦ are approximately the same. So along with reduction
of adversaries we require that exist relation tA 7−→ tA◦ , where tA is execution time of A and tA◦
is execution time of A◦. And we require that tA◦ 6 fs(tA), where fs is execution time of A◦
and those times satisfy condition of tA◦ 6 fs(tA), where fs is a polynomial function. So, when
distributions ϕ◦ and ϕ coincide, then a protocol is perfectly secure with running time overhead
fs. Being a perfectly secure protocol means that for all possible attack targets real protocol is
as secure as ideal protocol and we cannot improve any more.
If output distributions are -indistinguishable ϕ◦ ≡ ϕ, then real protocol is statically secure
and respectively if distributions are computationally ε-equivalent ϕ◦ ≡ε ϕ, protocol is (fs, t,
ε)-secure. For perfectly secure real protocol no success evaluation predicate can distinguish
which game is it playing. For computationally secure protocols a smaller set of predicates cannot
distinguish games, so we must put upper bound on predicate evaluation’s t-time.
Suppose we have a real world protocol pi, its ideal analogue pi◦ real world adversary A attack-
ing pi. Simulator SimA is an adversary against pi◦, that uses A internally. Essentially, we can
think of SimA as a proxy that sits between A and T of the ideal protocol and intercepts commu-
nication between them. It is clear, that generally real world adversary A cannot communicate
with T directly because of incompatibility of their interfaces, but SimA solves this problem.
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3.3 Oblivious transfer
Oblivious transfer is a special case of secure two-party computation [12]. Consider setting party
one has database of messages m = (m0, . . . ,mn). Party two has index i, of which message
does it want. The function those parties want to compute is f(m, i) = (⊥,mi). Security
requirements are the same as for general secure two-party computation: every party gets only
output intended for it and cannot learn other party’s input values. Note that if we assume there
is no way to organize oblivious transfer, then general secure two-party computation is obviously
also unachievable, cause oblivious transfer is special case of general two-party computation.
One of the most basic settings is one-out-of-two oblivious transfer
(
1
2
)
-OT , when message
database size is 2. There are many ways to implement oblivious transfer protocol and a lot of
research has been done in this area.
3.4 Security of multiparty computation
Consider following games at Figure 13 that describe multiparty computation setting.
GAREAL
sample : φ1, φ2, . . . , φn, φA ← D
init : A(φA), P1(φ1), P2(φ2) . . . ,Pn(φn)
run protocol : pi
collect outputs : ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn, ϕA)
return B(ϕ)
GA◦IDEAL
sample : φ1, φ2, . . . , φn, φA ← D
init : A◦(φA), P1(φ1), P2(φ2) . . . ,Pn(φn)
run ideal protocol : pi◦
collect outputs : ϕ◦ = (ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕn, ϕA◦)
return B(ϕ◦)
Figure 13: Multiparty computation security games
Similar to secure two-party computation setting, real protocol is secure, if distributions of
parties’ outputs in real and ideal protocol runs are indistinguishable and t-time of ideal adversary
A◦ is comparable to real world adversary A t-time. More specifically, real protocol is perfectly
secure if both following conditions hold:
∀A ∃A◦∀D : ϕ◦ ≡ ϕ ,
tA◦ 6 fs(tA) ,
for a polynomial fs.
Additionally, in the same way as for secure two-party computation, we can define -statically
security and (fs, t, ε)-computational security for a real protocol if, respectively, ϕ
◦ ≡ ϕ or
ϕ◦ ≡ε ϕ and tA◦ 6 fs(tA) hold.
To get an insight, how proving security of a protocol works in a multiparty computation
setting, consider a model of an protocol’s communication between several parties on the Figure
14. We have four parties that are represented by circles and double-ended arrows represent
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Figure 14: Real protocol’s communication model
communication channels that are between every pair of parties. Now to model an ideal analogue
of this protocol we substitute direct communications between parties with a communication via
trusted third party T as defined on Figure 15).
Figure 15: Ideal protocol’s communication model with T
An exact way of adversary controlling corrupted parties must be specified by the setting, but
one of the most usual settings used is static corruption of at most k parties. This means that
adversary chooses upto k parties to corrupt before protocol execution, and it gets all information
these parties have if it is a honest-but-curious adversary or gets full control over these parties in
a malicious setting. Consider a figure below, suppose parties on the right of T are corrupted and
send all their information to an adversary.
Now, to prove security of the protocol, we need to add a simulator to that model. Simulator
has two interfaces: T interface which is used to organize communication in a ideal protocol, and
adversary interface which deals with a real world protocol and adversary implementation. Look
at the Figure 16.
Dashed circles are virtual parties that simulator creates to accommodate communication
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Figure 16: Simulator fits between real world adversary and ideal protocol
between adversaries and corrupted parties. Additionally, simulator controls randomness source
and CPU of an adversary to being able to rewind adversary and execute it from the beginning to
supply it with a predefined randomness. Now, the goal of simulator construction is to put a real
world adversary against an ideal protocol. All the computation is done by ideal protocol and
must be as secure as possible. If there exist correspondence A 7−→ SimA such that outputs of
parties in the run with simulator were indistinguishable from the output of the parties without
it. Then adversary can simulate this run by itself and actual engagement of a real party does
not add knowledge of an adversary, thus protocol is secure.
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4 Introduction to Yao garbled circuits
Consider the following modified scenario of secure two-party computation. Two parties P1 and
P2 want to compute (∅, z)← f(x1, x2), where x1 and x2 are respective parties inputs. Important
difference from a general two-party computation case is that only one party is going to receive
meaningful output value, as sender P1 always receives ∅ if protocol run completes.
First general solution to such secure two party computation problem was proposed by A. A.
Yao in the seminar paper [1]. His idea consists of three main techniques:
• reordering gate’s truth table rows to hide content of the gate;
• modifying boolean circuit to operate on encryption scheme keys, not just bit values;
• using oblivious transfer to securely give evaluation party input to the circuit.
In this thesis we use xor+PRG array encryption scheme AEf described before. This simplifies
description of Yao garbled circuit construction procedure and is somewhat easier to understand
for a reader.
4.1 Yao garbled circuit construction
Flipping values on wires. We start securing boolean circuit evaluation with the following
procedure. In the evaluation process, every wire in circuit will hold one bit value. We need those
values not to provide any meaningful information to the adversary. To do that we will randomly
modify the meaning of this value. Procedure to do that is the following, for every wire we with
probability one half “flip” its values. Flipped values are then detached from actual meaning of
value on the wire, cause a wire which must hold value, for instance, 1, after being flipped can
contain either 1 or 0.
If we do not modify anything else in the circuit, obviously evaluation will not compute intended
function correctly. Thus, we must modify content of truth-tables of gates accordingly. As an
illustration of the said before, suppose we have an and gate with its ordinary truth-table. This
gate has two input wires and one output wire. Suppose then that we have flipped the value on
first input of the gate (wire x in the Table 2), then 0 on that wire actually means 1. Suppose
flipped wire x is denoted by x¯, then we modify the table in the following way.
x¯ y x ∧ y
0 0 0
0 1 1
1 0 0
1 1 0
Table 2: and gate truth table with flipped x wire
Note, that we have changed contents of result column of that table. If values on wires y or
x∧y have been also flipped, we would need to also take that into account when computing table.
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Extending values on wires. Procedure for this step of securing circuit evaluation is the
following, for every wire w of the circuit we generate two random keys for array encryption
scheme. We just create two random keys for each wire. Then we use gates’ reorganized truth-
tables from the previous step, and substitute bit values in those with corresponding wire keys.
Let k0x, k
1
x, k
0
y, k
1
y be keys generated for wires x and y respectively. Additionally, let k
0
z , k
1
z be
keys generated for gate’s output wire z.
Also, let f be a pseudorandom generator that we will feed to array encryption scheme to
stretch keys. Then we put those keys into the truth-table of the gate and encrypt values of the
output column (see Table 3). As in the previous example, we have wire x flipped, and denote that
x¯ y x ∧ y
k0x k
0
y enck0x,k0y (k
0
z ||0)
k0x k
1
y enck0x,k1y (k
1
z ||1)
k1x k
0
y enck1x,k0y (k
0
z ||0)
k1x k
1
y enck1x,k1y (k
0
z ||0)
Table 3: and gate encrypted truth table
by using x¯ in the gate’s truth-table. Note, that output wire key is concatenated with a bit value,
so domains for array encryption scheme are then: K = {0, 1}128, M = {0, 1}129, C = {0, 1}129;
for AES with 128-bit keys as pseudorandom generator.
Now output column of this table is filled with pseudorandom data. Garbled circuit generation
is finished now and description of the circuit will consist of:
• description of wires, from which gate it goes to which;
• description of gates: encrypted flipped truth table result column.
Note that in order to reverse the output of the circuit, which will be a key value, circuit gener-
ator, also known as generating party, must remember corresponding key to bit value transitions
and if output wire was flipped. This means that if circuit generator has flipped values on output
wires of the circuit, it must remember which wire has it flipped, cause then value produced by
circuit evaluation could be flipped one.
Transferring keys to evaluator. Now this circuit cannot be evaluated without knowing
keys corresponding to a values for input wires. Party that generated circuit can send keys
corresponding to its input with circuit description, they do not reveal bits of input, so it is still
private. On the other hand, parties need to engage in oblivious transfer protocol to get keys that
correspond to circuit evaluating party’s input to evaluator.
The setting for Yao garbled circuit protocol is such, that generating party has two keys and
evaluating party has a bit value for each input wire. After oblivious transfer circuit evaluator
will learn key value corresponding to input value and circuit generator will learn nothing.
To evaluate a garbled circuit, party receives its description and keys corresponding to party
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input. Then through oblivious transfer protocol run it obtains keys corresponding to its input
and continues with the following evaluation scheme. For every gate which input wires contain
key values, decrypt truth table. As every row of truth table is encrypted with different key pairs
it will be able to decrypt only one row. Set values from that decrypted row to outgoing wires of
this gate. Proceed with this gate by gate evaluation until no non-evaluated gates left. Collect
circuit output value from output wires. These values for every output wire w, will be in the form
of outw = key||b, where key is one of the keys generated for output wires and b is a bit value of
the output. Note, that for input and intermediate wires key values needed to proceed with circuit
evaluation. However, we do not use key values of output wires, cause nothing is encrypted with
those. So generator of the circuit can put any bit-string of corresponding length there. Array
encryption scheme works fine on any bit-strings and actually can be used to encrypt messages of
arbitrary length, so it does not limit information that can be put on an output wire. Additional
feature of Yao garbled circuit protocol is that output wires can be flipped or not. If output wires
are certainly not flipped, evaluator in addition to bit-string information will learn bit value of
the output. On the other hand, setting my be fixed so that generating party can flip values on
output wires, then, evaluator will learn just information contained in output bit-string and not
actual bit values.
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5 Security of Yao circuit evaluation
First public results about Yao garbled circuit were available from 1982, but the whole paper by
A.A.Yao [1] was not publicly disclosed. Actually only the extended abstract is publicly available.
No rigorous proof of security for garbled circuit protocol can be found there. One published proof
appeared in 2009 by Lindell and Pinkas [11]. In this paper we provide another proof that Yao
garbled circuit protocol is secure against semi-honest adversary. Semi-honest adversary follows
protocol and just tries to investigate information to learn other party’s output.
Note, that despite the fact that there must exist a dominant party in two-party computation, in
case of Yao circuit evaluation domination does not provide any additional advantage for parties.
Suppose sender P1 is in dominant position, then after receiving its output it can abort compu-
tation. Fortunately, its output is always ∅, so it cannot learn anything from it and aborting
the computation is equivalent to refusing to submit its input: in both cases sender gets null
and receiver P2 receives ⊥. If receiver is dominant it also does not change anything to abort
computation, cause sender then receives ⊥ instead of ∅, which does not play any relevant role
either. So we deliberately remove that dominance step from two-party computation process and
further do not mention it.
Now the setting for secure Yao circuit evaluation is that there are parties sender P1, receiver P2
and T in an ideal model. Let x be sender’s input, y receiver’s input and F (x, y) function P1 want
to compute. As the result of the protocol, receiver learns F (x, y), sender learns nothing.
Note a very important observation, that then there exists function f(y) = F (x, y), such function
where sender’s input is specified implicitly. We will insist on the condition that f must be a
predicate (have one-bit output) and be representable with a boolean circuit. Additional detail
is that, however we need f be a predicate, Yao garbled circuit can hold arbitrary information
attached to the output values. We let messages z0, z1 be bit-string of appropriate size be attached
to output values 0 and 1 respectively.
Now we require this computation to be correct, as in actually computing not to leak infor-
mation about other parties’ inputs, but we allow the receiver to obtain some knowledge about
the function f , more specifically it will learn skeleton of boolean circuit that specifies f . We
use notion skeleton(f) to refer to this information. If f = ⊥ or evaluation of f(y) = ⊥, then
receiver will get ⊥ as a result. Consider then, the following scheme at Figure 17, that describes
the protocol run in an ideal model.
We will name that protocol an ideal conditional oblivious transfer COT◦. During COT◦ one
party specifies single bit output function f and two strings z0 and z1, other specifies input y and
the second party gets zf(y).
Now, when we have specified how Yao circuit evaluation goes in ideal model, let us quickly
recall how the protocol is implemented in a real world. Sender prepares garbled circuit, encrypt
it and has keys for input wires ready to be transferred to receiver. Then parties are engaged in
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Figure 17: Yao circuit evaluation in ideal model, COT◦
series of OT protocols to transfer keys corresponding to receiver’s input to receiver. Next, sender
sends circuit description to receiver, which then evaluates this garbled circuit and gets output
bit b and a bit-string that was used as a key for output wire.
In this chapter we prove the following theorem regarding the security of garbled circuit
protocol described above.
Theorem 2. If AEf is (t, ε)-array encryption scheme, COT is perfectly secure against malicious
sender and (t, |C| ·ε)-secure against malicious receiver, where |C| is number of gates in the circuit
describing function supplied by sender.
The proof is divided into several parts that we describe in next subsections. We start with
proving security against sender and then proceed with proof of security in case where circuit
receiver is corrupted.
5.1 Security against corrupted sender
5.1.1 Security against semi-honest sender
The case of corrupted generating party is trivial, but to be consistent we still present a proof of
security here.
In current setting in standalone model corrupted party gets input to the protocol as φ =
(history, f, z0, z1), where history is any information available to a party before protocol run,
and f, z0, z1 is the intended input.
It is easy to construct a simulator in this model, a SimA receives the same intended input
f, z0, z1. Then it is engaged in a series of OT protocols with P1. As a result of each of these OT
31
protocol, P1 needs to receive ∅, so SimA provides these ∅. Note, that semi-honest sender cannot
modify its intended input, so SimA proceeds with sending this f, z0, z1 to T as the input to ideal
Yao circuit evaluation. Sender does not receive any more output, so SimA is done. Computation
is correct, as it is performed by T.
We proceed then with showing that distributions of the outputs of the parties are indistin-
guishable. Note that, P1’s output must be in any case ∅ as it is ∅,. . . , ∅ for OT protocols, so
it is the same as in ideal protocol. P2 will receive some output from circuit evaluation, cause
circuit generating party is semi-honest, so it follows protocol and circuit will be evaluable. And
thus, the output of P2 coincides with the P2’s output in ideal model.
Now in both ideal and real models, in the protocol run adversary sees P1’s input and all values
received by P1. As these coincide in ideal and real model, adversary behavior and output is the
same in ideal and real models. Now we showed that outputs of ideal protocol (ϕ◦1, ϕ
◦
2, ϕ
◦
A) are
equivalent to those of real protocol (ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕA), simulator overhead is negligible, thus protocol
is as secure as the ideal functionality provided by T. Note, that formally, we need to prove that
t-time of the SimA is at most polynomially larger than t-time of A. However, as SimA does not
do any computation by itself its overhead is not significant. Note, that in proofs further in this
thesis, we omit explicit specification of simulator’s t-time if a trivial intuition correctly suggests
that overhead is polynomial.
5.1.2 Security against malicious sender
The case with maliciously corrupted sender is different, case actual input to the protocol in this
case can be different from the intended input that simulator knows. Thus, we must first extract
the “actual”. This is done in the following manner.
Recall, that parties do series of OT protocols to transfer keys to receiver. Parties use ideal
OT that includes T. So sender’s input to that OT protocols for each input wire w contains both
keys, the one that corresponds to value 0 and the one for value 1.
During these OT protocols, simulator SimA collects all keys that correspond to all possible
inputs of the receiver and responds with expected ∅ to the sender. Now, sender provides garbled
circuit description. Note, that simulator has now all input keys and thus is able to fully disclose
the circuit obtaining both actual output values zˆ0, zˆ1 instead of one, and plain description of the
f (as it can trace how circuit evaluation actually went). Then SimA submits (f, zˆ0, zˆ1) as the
input to ideal Yao circuit evaluation and finishes.
Computation is correct, as it is performed by T which has received actual input values origi-
nated by malicious sender. Distributions of outputs are the same, as P1 receives ∅ and several
∅ as result of OT protocols. P2 gets one of zˆ0, zˆ1 in both ideal and real models. Exact value
which it receives depends only on its input, so for honest receiver it will be the same value in
both ideal and real models. Adversary, as in semi-honest case, sees P1 inputs (f, z0, z1) and all
values seen by P1 which includes several ∅ from OT protocol runs and ∅ as P1’s output. These
values coincide with values seen by adversary in ideal model, so adversary’s outputs in real and
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ideal models are the same.
Thus, we have shown that Yao circuit evaluation is perfectly secure against malicious sender.
5.2 Security against corrupted receiver
To prove security of Yao garbled circuit protocol against corrupted receiver, we start from an
ideal protocol implementation, which uses trusted third party and gradually replace parts of the
ideal protocol with parts of the real protocol in a way that preserves security.
We start with a showing ideal functionality of Yao garbled circuit protocol. First of all, let’s
fix the problem in detail. There are two parties P1 and P2 that have their private inputs x and
y and they want to compute a function F (x, y) = (∅, z). Moreover to simplify the construction
of protocol, let function f(y) = F (x, y) be already presented as a boolean circuit. Refer back
to Figure 17, which defines ideal Yao protocol functionality. Now we have honest sender, so the
function it incorporates into garbled protocol is the intended one, so T knows it. Additionally,
to enhance readability we explixitly specify sender P1’s input, despite the fact that it can be
hidden in the definition of function f to compute. Consider the following simplified model at
Figure 18 that describes this case.
Figure 18: Ideal Yao circuit functionality
We have two bit inputs x = x1x0 and y = y1y0 on the left side of a big box and an output z1 on
the right side. Let this box be constructed in a way that no adversary can see what is done inside
it. The computation in the box is performed by a trusted third party. This protocol is secure.
Now we start modifying this construction by implementing procedures described previously in
the section about construction of garbled circuit. We will show that doing so preserves secureness
of the protocol.
First of all, we with probability one half flip values on every wire and modify gates of a circuit
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to accommodate those flipped values. Let’s formally define and investigate properties of flipping
procedure. Flipping a wire means that we sample a fair coin and xor its result with value on the
wire. Suppose σ ← {0, 1}, then wflipped = w ⊕ σ. Note that probability that there will be a
certain value on wire is one half.
Pr[wflipped = 0] = Pr[w = 0] · Pr[σ = 0] + Pr[w = 1] · Pr[σ = 1] = Pr[w = 0] · 1
2
+ Pr[w = 1] · 1
2
=
1
2
Pr[wflipped = 1] = Pr[w = 0] · Pr[σ = 1] + Pr[w = 1] · Pr[σ = 0] = Pr[w = 0] · 1
2
+ Pr[w = 1] · 1
2
=
1
2
=
1
2
And now we can safely allow adversary to see values on the wires. Figure 19 clarifies this
setting. Assuming that P2 is corrupted, adversary can see now values that are on the wires
marked with small A boxes. We denote gates whose truth-table is modified according to wires
being flipped with ⊗ symbol.
Figure 19: Hybryd Yao protocol with T gates evaluation
Now, evaluation of the circuit goes essentially as before, but not in one step with T. Instead,
we have circuit gates that can be computed by T, and wires that are visible to an adversary.
But we have already flipped wires’ values and changed gates functionality to mirror those flips
to preserve correctness of computation. As in settings before, parties do series of OT protocols
to transfer keys corresponding to receiver’s input to receiver. Then receiver starts to evaluate
ideal gates. Hybrid protocol insists that receiver first evaluate all input gates of the circuit, to
incorporate that we will restrict circuits so that every output bit depends on all input bits, so
for every bit of output zi = F (x0, . . . , xn, y0, . . . , yn), where F is some function. This will ensure
that all input gates must be evaluated before any output gate while we, obviously, do not exclude
any functions from being computable that way.
Then receiver proceeds with opening all other gates of the circuit. Ideal gate evaluation goes in
the following manner. Receiver provides inputs for the gate to T and receives values for output
wires of that gate.
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Lemma 3. If circuit’s wire has been flipped, gates are implemented as ideal gates and adversary
can evaluate every gate only once, then evaluation is correct and perfectly secure against semi-
honest receiver.
Proof. (Sketch) Note, that protocol insists that input gates are evaluated first, so we show that
after evaluation of input gates adversary does not learn anything. Adversary cannot learn input
directly, as only one party is corrupted and other party sends its input directly to T. Any wire
evaluated by receiver contains random value from {0, 1} with equal probabilities, so it does not
leak information. So while adversary sends values of intermediate gates to T, it receives a value
for a wire which does not allow him to learn if the output wire was flipped or not. Evaluation of
the output gates reveals outputs to P2, as output wires are never flipped.
Next, we show a simulator for this protocol. As in previous case, Sim starts engaging in series
of OT protocols. With each OT Sim gets one bit of receiver’s input and to obtain “actual” input
just concatenates them appropriately. Receiver on the other hand for each OT wants to receive a
response with a key, that corresponds to his input bit. Simulator generates these keys randomly
as a circuit generating party would do when garbling a circuit, and send them to receiver.
After that simulator proceeds with ideal Yao circuit evaluation with T as now it knows
receiver’s input. As a result Sim receives from T skeleton(f) of the circuit and actual output
value. Simulator transfers skeleton(f) to receiver.
Now receiver starts to evaluate gates of the circuit. For every non-output gate Sim responds
to receiver with a randomly generated key value. Note that these values come from the same
distribution as original keys that were situated on the circuit wires. In response to evaluation of
output gate Sim sends actual output value it got from T to receiver.
Protocol run with simulator produces correct output as P1 receives correct output ∅ and P2
receives correct output as Sim just proxies output received from T. For every output wire of
intermediate gate Sim replies with random values, which have the same distribution as values
returned by T in ideal model. Thus, part of information available to the adversary, which includes
P1’s input, all messages receiver by P1, which are ∅’s, is the same in ideal and real models. The
other part on information available to the adversary, namely keys for wires of the circuit comes
from the same distribution in ideal and real models, so adversary’s outputs must be the same
in ideal and real models. Thus protocol is correct and perfectly secure against semi-honest
receiver.
Now, note very important detail that T will evaluate every gate only once. If we allow evalu-
ating party to evaluate gate more than once (for different input values), then party can evaluate
gate for all possible input sets, determine if output value was flipped or not and determine other
party’s input for this gate.
Now we need to implement this one-time evaluating gate as a real functionality. For that, consider
the Figure 20 that describes the circuit evaluation model for next step of the proof of security.
Now all wires and truth-tables of gates marked with a small box with A are visible to adversary.
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Figure 20: Real circuit visibility model
As adversary now knows content of truth-tables it could evaluate gates more than once, thus
it can deduct information about inputs. To overcome this problem we substitute bit values on
wires to a randomly generated keys for array encryption scheme (described in previous chapter)
and use input wire values to encrypt output wires values.
Let g be a pseudorandom generator, for instance we can use AES’s key stretching procedure as
such.
Suppose we will use AES with 128 bit keys as pseudorandom generator in array encryption
scheme described previously. Array encryption scheme needs to operate then on the following
domains:
enc : {0, 1}128 × {0, 1}128 × {0, 1}129 −→ {0, 1}129 ,
dec : {0, 1}128 × {0, 1}128 × {0, 1}129 −→ {0, 1}129 .
We concatenate keys of the output wires with probably flipped bit values of wires to ensure
that evaluator knows which cell of truth-table to decrypt.
As described previously array encryption scheme, when using good pseudorandom generator,
is fairly secure against chosen plaintext attacks, we now have the result that adversary can only
open one cell of the encrypted truth-tables of each gate.
Now we have all needed results to state the following compiler theorem.
Theorem 3. If AEf is (t, ε)-array encryption scheme, Yao garbled circuit protocol that uses
AEf to encrypt truth-tables of circuit’s gates is perfectly secure agaist malicious sender and (t,
|C| · ε)-secure against malicious receiver, where |C| is number of gates in the circuit.
Proof. (Sketch) As usual we start with the construction of an appropriate simulator Sim. Sim-
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ulator starts with series of OT protocols to transfer necessary keys to receiver. During every
OT run, receiver reveals one bit of his input to Sim, on the other hand Sim generates a key in
the same manner as sender would generate a wire key and send it to receiver. After all OT
protocols are completed receiver has a certain set of keys k. Simulator, on the other hand,
knows receiver’s actual input y and proceeds with ideal evaluation of Yao garbled circuit with
T, receiving skeleton(f) of the circuit and actual output value z.
Then simulator populates gates of skeleton(f) with arbitrary boolean functions, for example ∧,
thus getting a full circuit for function fˆ with the same skeleton, i.e., skeleton(fˆ) = skeleton(f).
Then simulator uses functionality of a honest garbled circuit sender with inputs (fˆ , z, z). Ad-
ditionally Sim makes sure that keys for input wires that correspond to receiver’s input are the
ones from k. Then Sim reveals description of this garbled circuit to receiver.
Note, as receiver knows keys from k it is able to evaluate that circuit (open one value of each
gate’s truth-table until the output wires). Moreover, as circuit was prepared with both output
values equal to z, after evaluation receiver will gets z as the output.
It is not trivial to rigorously prove, that receiver cannot distinguish between description of
garbled circuit received in real world run and the one supplied by simulator. However note,
that output values of receiver in both models coincide, as they are equal to z. Additionally,
skeleton(fˆ) = skeleton(f), so receiver cannot easily distinguish between those. An actual proof
can be done using mathematical induction by showing that after evaluation of every gate receiver
does not learn information that helps him to distinguish those circuits with probability more than
ε. We leave complete proof of this fact as an exercise for a interested and intelligent reader1.
These probabilities are accumulated for every gate producing in total |C| · ε probability that
these circuits can be distinguished. Note, that P2 in the real protocol does not interact with P1
except for OT-s, which are handled by T, and input submission. So there is no interaction where
malicious behavior can achieve any benefits compared to semi-honest behavior. So while we have
not said about adversary being malicious, the conclusion does not change and distributions of the
outputs for both parties and adversary remains indistinguishable from distribution of outputs in
ideal model.
Having shown that real protocol is simulatable, provides correct computation and its outputs
are indistinguishable from an ideal protocol run, we conclude that Yao garbled circuit protocol
is secure against malicious receiver.
5.3 Remark on security against malicious adversary
Note an interesting fact, in the previous section we have proven, that Yao garbled circuit evalu-
ation shaped as we did it (recall Figure 17) is secure against malicious adversary. Careful reader
would notice that it is different from the original problem setting for secure two-party compu-
tation. For secure two-party computation problem the setting is usually fixed in such way, that
both parties know what function F (x, y) they want to compute. However, we have modelled
1An interested and intelligent reader who has roughly 8 hours of free time and lots of tea or coffee to spare.
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ideal world so, that only sender specifies a function that will be computed. So, actually, Yao
garbled circuit protocol described above does not solve secure two-party computation problem
even for receiver only output functions (∅, z) ← F (x, y). The reason is that sender can specify
its input (fx, z0, z1) such that fx(y) 6= F (x, y).
However, modelling Yao garbled circuit in this way allows us to present a protocol using
symmetric Yao circuit evaluation to achieve security against malicious adversary in standard
secure two-party computation setting.
38
6 Consistent Yao circuit evaluation, Circus protocol
There exist several ways to increase security of Yao Circuit evaluation protocol to achieve security
against malicious adversary. Usually we sacrifice performance for that. Here we would like to
describe one common way to do that by including randomness into protocol by using technique
is called cut-and-choose.
Main idea of this technique is that circuit generator must prepare many circuits instead of one.
Evaluating party will choose some of them to evaluate and request sender to prove that leftover
circuit were produced correctly. After that receiver evaluates chosen circuits and majority of
theirs outputs is taken as final output value. Mohassel and Franklin state [2] that this approach
allows circuit evaluation to be secure with inverse exponential probability. However obviously
amount of computation and network resources needed to perform such protocol grow linearly
with number of circuits generator constructs. There are constant attempts to invent modified
protocols to secure Yao circuit evaluation against malicious adversary, but their performance tend
to suffer. For instance Abhi Shelat and Chih-Hao Shen derive [15] protocol that is faster than
usual cut-and-choose approach, but still with severe time overhead over plain Yao garbled circuit
evaluation protocol. In this thesis we present a protocol with better theoretical computational
performance.
6.1 Security models
First of all, we need to specify a security model that we will use. Recall a description of standard
ideal model presented earlier in Protocol 3. This is a strong model, where no information is
leaked to an adversary. We want to describe two more models that are weaker in the sense that
there exists possibility for adversary to get some additional information regarding other party’s
input.
K-leaked model. A weaker model that allows adversary, which we will denote as P1 to be
consistent with figures below, to learn k bits of other party’s input. This model was introduced by
Mohassel and Franklin [2], when they presented a protocol idea that became a base for protocol
presented in this thesis. Therefore for historical reasons and overall better understanding of
security properties of protocol presented further, we need to describe such model here. More
specifically, we show a 1-leaked model, where adversary gets to know 1 bit about other party’s
output. The computation in this model goes as described at Figure 21.
Note that we speak about 1-leaked model, if function g that P1 submits to T is a predicate.
If it is instead a k-bit output function this figure then describes 1-leaked model. Essentially, the
main difference from the standard ideal model lies in the fact, that corrupted party asks T a
predicate about other party’s input, receives the output of specified predicate. Presumably, P1
is in the dominant position here, as it can abort computation early, in which case P2 will receive
⊥ as the output.
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Figure 21: Two-party computation in k-leaked model
Consistency model. Consistent computation guarantees that malicious participants cannot
learn anything beyond their intended outputs and honest participants can detect malicious be-
havior that alters their outputs [16]. Consider the Figure 22 for description of computation in
the consistency model. The predicate pi() is called halting predicate, cause if it is true T halts
Figure 22: Two-party computation in consistency model
and broadcasts ⊥ for every output value. Note, that it is very similar to a function g(y) in the
1-leaked model, however we note it differently to emphasize it’s predicate nature of returning a
single bit. Additionally, note that this model is stronger than 1-leaked model described before,
as in case of consistent computation, corrupted party may learn 1 bit about other party’s input,
however it may occur that he does not. For symmetric function evaluation, where both parties
need to receive meaningful outputs, not ⊥, consistency model is equivalent to 1-leaked model, as
sender which received ⊥ will know that pi(y) was evaluated to true.
Note, that if we restrict ourselves to asymmetric functions, where sender receives ∅ as the
output, then consistent model satisfies privacy requirements of standard ideal model against
corrupted sender. As the only way for corrupted party to learn information is to submit a
specific predicate to T and observe its further behavior. If T sends normal value as the output
of the protocol, then predicate was evaluated to false, also, sender will receive ⊥ if predicate
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was true. However, as sender receives no output, then he cannot determine to which value was
predicate evaluated. Another interesting property is that if specified predicate is true, receiver
will also get ⊥ instead of a normal output value, which will indicate that sender was malicious.
In this thesis, we present a protocol for secure two-party computation problem that is secure
against malicious adversary in consistency model. To describe the protocol, we need several
subprotocols be defined as a black-box ideal functionality.
6.2 Subprotocols
To simplify analysis of the protocol we assume that several protocols exist and are implemented
either by specification provided with description below or using T.
Commitment scheme. First of all, we need a split receipt commitment scheme SR-Com.
Detailed description of security properties for such scheme based on some usual commitment
scheme Com was provided earlier in this thesis, so now we just specify how SR-Com imple-
mentation works. For futher analysis, assume that SR-Com split receip commitment scheme is
(t1, εhiding)-hiding and (t2, εbinding)-binding. Previously, we have shown how to construct a split
receipt commitment scheme from usual commitment scheme Com, which is (t1, εhiding)-hiding
and (t2, εbinding)-binding. Namely, to commit to message m, a party generates (c, d) = Com(m),
then splits decommitment value d additively into two parts (d1, d2) such that d = d1 + d2. To
commit to a message, party sends c to a receiver, and a triple (c, d1, d2) is a decommitment
value. Sender will leave one part of the decommitment d1 to himself, thus allowing to open the
commitment only when he provides it.
Disclose when equal. Another block needed for protocol construction is modified conditional
disclosure of secrets with equality check protocol DWE. For this protocol parties fix some condi-
tion and specify inputs. If condition specified is met by input values, then parties receive output,
which can be either directly specify by them or received during computation inside DWE.
We need a specific version of DWE, where parties specify parts of split receipt commitment
values in hope that they both can open other’s party commitment to the same value. In this
case, they will receive this value as the output. This behavior is described at Figure 23.
Notion of the variables used in Figure 23 is that barred value, for instance, c¯m0 is originally
produced by P2, while normal variables without a bar, for instance d
m1
1 are originally produced
by P1. The upper index on the variable shows during commitment of which message was this
value produced, for example, cm0 was produced in SR-Com(m0).
Now, this version of DWE◦ protocol does the following, each party provides parts of two
decommitment triples for SR-Com and the second decommitment value d2. Trusted third party
tries to open each of the commitment values of a party with decommitment value d2 provided
by other party. If T finds a pair of decommitment values that open to the same message, this
message becomes an output value. If parties fail to open each other’s split receipt commitment to
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Figure 23: DWE◦ protocol
the same value they both will receive ⊥. Note, that for consistency model we need asymmetric
version of DWE◦, where sender do not receive any output values, as opposite to a symmetric
DWE◦ pictured in the figure above.
6.3 Circus protocol description
Word circus refer to a series of choreographed acts given by travelling clowns, acrobats, trained
animals etc. The word also describes the performance that they give, which is usually a series
of acts that are choreographed to music and introduced by a “ringmaster”. We hope that such
name properly resembles the flow of values in the protocol, that we will define further, and pro-
vides appropriate mnemonic experience.
We assume that all primitives mentioned above exist and treat them as an ideal black-box im-
plementations. Additionally parties have fixed a function F (x, y) they want to compute before
protocol run. From a bird’s eye view Circus protocol can be describes as following. Parties
execute split receipt commitment protocols and obtain commitments to messages “0” and “1”.
Then they execute two rounds of COT protocols P1 with P2 on receiving end and the other way
around (some details on this will follow). Then parties use DWE providing commitments from
the beginning and results of corresponding COT-s. Then they output whatever DWE output was.
Figure 24 describes Circus with black-box implementations of subprotocols defined above.
Consistently with the notion used before, every value with a bar, i. e. f¯() is originated at
the receiver’s side, and values without bar on the sender’s side. Additionally note, that however
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Figure 24: Circus protocol
parties have fixed a boolean function F (x, y) to compute, they submit other functions to COT◦
protocols. A honest P1 will submit function f¯(y) = F (x, y) and a honest P2 is expected to submit
function fˆ(x) = F (x, y). Let us also assume that the function F (x, y) is such, that both parties
want to obtain the same value: zi = F (x, y). Also both parties know that function F (x, y) is
a predicate, so output can be either 0 or 1, so honest parties will specify m0 = 0 and m1 = 1.
Now we have fixed all important details and can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4. If SR-Com is a (t, εbinding)-split receipt commitment scheme, the following statements
hold. If P1 is malicious, P2 receive either F (x, y) or ⊥, where x is the message submitted to
second instance of COT◦, with probability 1−εbinding. If P2 is malicious, P1 receive either F (x, y)
or ⊥, where y is the message submitted to first instance of COT◦, with probability 1− εbinding.
Proof. First, we investigate malicious P1 case. Consider the following decommitment triples that
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are involved in DWE◦ protocol:
t0 = (c¯
m0 , d¯1
m0 , d¯2
m0) ,
t1 = (c¯
m0 , d¯1
m0 , ˆ¯d
mf¯(y)
2 ) ,
t2 = (c¯
m1 , d¯1
m1 , d¯2
m1) ,
t3 = (c¯
m1 , d¯1
m1 , ˆ¯d
mf¯(y)
2 ) .
Decommitment triples t0 and t2 are constructed by honest P2 and thus open to respectively
m0 and m1. As split receipt commitment scheme SR-Com is εbinding-binding, each of the triples
t1 and t2 can only be opened to respectively m0, m1 or ⊥. If malicious P1 can, for instance, open
triple t1 to another value, we can straightforwardly construct adversary winning split receipt
commintment binding game. Additionally, both those triples can be open to non-⊥ values with
negligible probability, so only one of these triples will produce a non-⊥ value.
Thus, using value provided by malicious P1, which is
ˆ¯d
mf¯(y)
2 , DWE
◦ can open exactly one of
the triples generated by P2 to exactly the value P2 has commited to.
Now, note that, P2 is honest, so when it provides value d
mf¯(x)
2 it opens right commitment
triple generated by P1 as f¯(x) = F (x, y).
So now, DWE◦ will produce correct output, cause P1’s commitment will be opened using
correct decommitment value computed by P2 and P1 cannot open commitment values originated
at the receiver’s side to anything else, but intended values with probability more than εbinding.
In case P1 tries to maliciously open commited values, DWE
◦ will result in ⊥ as an output for P2.
Exactly the same reasoning shows that in case of malicious P2, P1 will receive correct output
or ⊥ from DWE◦, if P2 does not succeed in double opening commitment values which occurs
with probability εbinding.
6.4 Security of symmetric circuit evaluation
There are opinions that this protocol proposed by Mohassel and Franklin [2] is flawed and does
not provide security against malicious adversary even in k-leaked model. Kiraz and Schoenmakers
[14] propose the following case where malicious adversary can learn a bit of other’s party input
without revealing being corrupted. Assume parties want to compute which 3-bit input is greater.
Let P1 be corrupted and P2 a honest one. Suppose they have respectively inputs x = 4 = 100b
and y = 7 = 111b, where notion nb stands for number n in binary. Now P1 constructs a garbled
circuit and submits 100b as its input there. Then, when it receives another garbled circuit
(constructed by P2) for evaluation it sets 5 = 101b as its input. Both circuits evaluations will
return that P2’s input is greater, so conditional disclosure of secrets won’t find corruption and
P2 will not know that P1 was cheating. On the other hand P1 now concludes that P2’s input is
greater than 100b and 101b and thus second bit of P2’s input is 1. Information leaks, protocol is
flawed [14]. However, we must notice, that this is not actually an attack, and this trick can be
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pulled also in the ideal model.
Let’s say that adversary want to use this modifying input technique to learn a bit from other
party’s input in consistency model. So let an adversary A be engaged in computing function
gt(x, y), where x and y are three bit numbers. Adversary submits 4 = 101b as its input value to
T. Now it forms a halting predicate pi(y) = gt(4, y) 6= gt(5, y) and checks if T response afterwards
is ⊥ or not. As receiver’s input was 7, predicate is false, and parties will know that receiver’s
input is greater. But by the same reasoning as in real protocol attack described above, adversary
knows that P2’s input is greater that 5 and can deduce information about receiver’s input. So
this attack exists also in ideal model and thus do not reduce security of real protocol compared
to ideal one.
Now we have shown that most straightforward accusations of insecurity of the protocol do
not hold, so we proceed with proving security of Circus protocol and proving that it provides
consistency of computation.
6.4.1 Simulator construction
In this section we show how to construct simulator SimP1 with which P1 could communicate
such that the output of protocol run is indistinguishable from a run without simulator. Let’s say
parties want to compute function F (x, y) of their respective inputs x and y. As we are dealing
with consistency model, Sim relies on halting predicate for T to provide consistency of outputs
in real model.
Before anything else, Sim generates randomness r1 to initialize malicious Pˆ1, that Sim will use
internally and randomness r2 that will be used to simulate actions that real world P2 would have
taken in the real protocol run. These values will ensure, that we can align every real protocol
run to a specific run of ideal protocol, where parties are initialized with exactly those values as
randomness source.
Protocol starts with parties creating commitments for messages m0 = 0 and m1 = 1 and then
proceeds with parties sending commitment values to each other. As the adversary is malicious it
can send arbitrary values instead of properly generated ones, so Sim receives from P1 values cˆ
m0 ,
cˆm1 . We will use hatted values to denote that this message can contain arbitrary value. Then
Sim generates valid commitment triples (c¯m0 , dˆ1
m0
, dˆ2
m0
)← SR-Com(0) and (c¯m1 , dˆ1m1 , dˆ2m1)←
SR-Com(1) and sends c¯m0 and c¯m1 to P1.
At this point sender is ready to start with COT◦ protocols, so Sim receives dˆ2
m0
, dˆ2
m1
, f().
P1 does not want anything in response here, so Sim just proceeds with second instance of COT
◦.
For the second instance of COT◦ sender specifies its input x. Note, that sender is malicious,
and this submitted value can be different from intended input, but that just makes this x an
“actual” input of sender. In response Sim sends d¯2
m0 to P1. As split receipt commitment scheme
is εhiding-hiding, adversary do not know to which bit value was f(y) evaluated. Additionally,
note that it is not important which decommitment value will be sent to P1, as following DWE
◦
is also simulated and not actually computed.
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At this point Sim knows sender’s actual input, so Sim can perform ideal protocol run with T.
So Sim submits x to T as sender’s input. Then Sim constructs the following halting predicate:
pi(y) = Circus(Pˆ1(xi, r1),P2(y, r2))
?
= (?,⊥) ,
where ? means, that we are not interested in sender’s output value, predicate just makes sure
that receiver will get ⊥ as the result, and xi is the intended input for P1. Note, that this
predicate is efficient as it takes the same time to evaluate predicate as Circus protocol run takes,
so predicate’s overhead is polynomial, which is acceptable.
This predicate can be constructed cause Sim knows description of corrupted P1 and descrip-
tion of how honest P2 must behave. Now if we are in 1-leaked model, then Sim will receive either
an output value or ⊥ from the T. Then Sim proceeds with receiving five values from the sender
for DWE◦. To finish the protocol Sim responds to P1 with whatever value it received from T at
the previous step.
Similarly, if we are talking about consistency model where Sim does not receive anything
from T after submitting halting predicate. But, as we are in the consistency model, sender does
not want to receive anything as a result of final DWE◦ protocol run. So after submitting halting
predicate to T, Sim just receives five values as sender’s input to DWE◦ and does not do anything
else.
Such simulator obviously implements interface to successfully communicate with real world
P1, so to prove security of the protocol we need to prove that outputs of parties coincide in real
and ideal models. Proving equivalence of outputs is trivial due to the specific nature of halting
predicate. Note, that after receiving such halting predicate T evaluates if this protocol run must
finish with output values or ⊥ values. Note, that in any case P2 will receive the same output
value. If the protocol run must end with ⊥ value as output for P2, halting predicate will be true,
so T halts and sends ⊥ to P2. If protocol must end with an actual value output for P2, halting
predicate will be false, and T will return actual value F (x, y) as the output for P2. Note, that
as we have aligned randomness before protocol run, every run of the real protocol is matched to
exactly one run of the ideal protocol with equivalent outputs for receiver. Thus distribution of
receiver’s output coincide in both real and ideal models.
To prove equivalence of the sender’s outputs, note, that as the result of DWE◦ simulator
submits whatever value T responded as protocol output for P1. So P1’s output is the same in
real and ideal models. Note, that before DWE◦ protocol, P1 sees only commited values, which,
as split receipt commitment is εhiding-hiding, ensure, that does not know actual values involved
in current computation, so its output in real model will coincide with the output in ideal model.
Adversary sees all values corrupted P1 knows, but except P1’ inputs and output, all intermediate
values are generated randomly by Sim. So adversary’s output must also be the same in real and
ideal models. Thus distributions of the outputs coincide in real and ideal models, which proves
that protocol is secure.
Similarly for consistency model, P2’s output in the same in both real and ideal models.
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Sender does not receive any output, so its output ∅ is the same in both models. Due to the same
argument as for 1-leaked model, output of the adversary also coincides in both models.
Note, that 1 bit about other party’s input is leaked due to halting predicate nature. If function
F (x, y) is symmetric, the same halting predicate leaks 1 bit to the adversary in the consistency
model also.
Note that, however we do not provide exact specification of simulator for the corrupted
receiver case, one can construct a simulator similar to one above that uses the same technique
for halting predicate construction to ensure equivalence of outputs in real and ideal models.
6.5 Circus construction scheme
Constructing a general scheme implementing Circus for predicates is straightforward. We need a
split receipt commitment scheme, which can be constructed from a usual commitment scheme.
Asymmetric Yao garble circuit protocols boxes can be constructed as described above with one-
time-pad array encryption scheme, using, for example, AES as pseudorandom generator.
We also can construct a DWE protocol, as a special case of Conditional Disclosure of secrets
protocol, for reference, how to construct that refer to Sven Laur and Helger Lipmaa paper [17].
Additionally note, that however we do not present a rigorous proof, but, intuitively, Circus
protocol is parallelly composable. To prove this fact, we must show a simulator construction
for parallel execution of several Circus protocol runs. Such a simulator can be constructed using
several simulators for a single Circus protocol run, however exact prove of such simulator existence
is left beyond the scope of current thesis to preserve its space and readability. Next, we show
the Circus protocol can be constructed and provide experimental result of its implementation.
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7 Experimental results
We investigate possible implementation of Circus protocol as a case study. First, we describe how
we could have implemented necessary subprotocols and then discuss the implementation and its
performance.
7.1 Adaptation for MPC-platform
Descrined by Dan Bogdanov, Sven Laur and Jan Willemson [18], Sharemind is implemented as
a platform for privacy preserving computations [19]. Basically, Sharemind is a virtual machine
that consist of three miner machines that can perform math operations on additively shared
integers. It does so in a such way, that private values (those that no individual miner must
know) before being put into a virtual machine are shared between miners. Additive sharing
of integer n between miners P1, P2 and P3 means that three random integers s0, s1 and s2
such that n = s0 + s1 + s2 are created (s0 and s1 are generated randomly and s2 computed
as s2 = n − s0 − s1) and sent to respective miners. Now it is easy to perform basic math
operations on shared values. For instance to add two shared values x and y shared as sx0 , s
x
1 ,
sx2 for x and s
y
0, s
y
1, s
y
2 for y each miner just computes its share of z = x + y as sum of its
shared for x and y. Indeed, sx0 + s
y
0 + s
x
1 + s
y
1 + s
x
2 + s
y
2 = x + y = z. In a similar manner
subtraction and multiplication can be performed. However, computing more difficult functions
on additively shared values, consider division for example, needs trickier protocols. We will use
envelope notation [[x]] to denote operations performed on shared value x. A result of operation
on shared values is also a shared value, so, for example, notion [[z]] = [[x]]+[[y]] means that parties
compute shared value z as a sum of shared values x and y.
A shared value becomes publicly available when all miners send their shares for this value to all
other miners. This is known as publishing a value, which we will denote as pubPi([[x]]), where
index shows to which miner value is published. If no index is specified, it means that value is
made public and available to all miners.
Having this multiparty computation platform we can construct protocols with more ease than
by using other cryptographic primitives. Note, that due to the fact that consistent computation
cannot be ensured in three-party computation against maliciously corrupted party [16], this pro-
tocol cannot be securely implemented in current Sharemind platform.
Obviously, slow versions of protocols described below, that are based on some two-party
computation schemes and involve only two out of three miners are possible in Sharemind, however
such implementation does not interest us in the scope of current thesis.
7.1.1 Commitment scheme in MPC-platform
Commitment among miners that additively share values goes in the following manner. Assume
that miner P1 wants to commit message m. It generates random d ← Z2n , where n is length
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of value that can be shared. Sharemind operates on 32-bit integers, so in its case n = 32.
Additionally, every commitment operation gets a public identifier id, just for miners to be sure
that they all operate on the same commitment. When this id and d are ready, P1 shares d and
m, and notifies other miners what is current commitment id.
To open a commitment miner, let’s say it is P2, shares its version of decommitment value d
∗,
then miners compute message as:
[[m∗]] = [[[d]] ?= [[d∗]]] · [[m]] ,
pubP2(m
∗) .
So now, if P2 knew or guessed correctly decommitment value it gets message m. This com-
mitment scheme is only statistically hiding, as P2 can guess value of d.
7.1.2 Oblivious transfer in MPC-platform
Oblivious transfer in MPC platform that uses additive shares can be achieved in the following
way. Let’s name three miners of Sharemind as P1, P2 and P3. Suppose P1 has two values x0 and
x1 and P2 knows bit b. We want to perform an oblivious transfer so P2 learns xb, but not x1−b
and no miner learns b. To do so, P1 shares x0 and x1 between miners and P2 shares b. Then
miners compute message m.
[[m]] = [[x0]] · ([[1]]− [[b]]) + [[x1]] · [[b]] =
[[m0]] if b = 0[[m1]] if b = 1
After this computation all miners have their shares of m and after pubP2(m), P2 learns mb.
7.1.3 Conditional disclosure of secrets in MPC platform
Conditional disclosure of secrets protocol also is available between machines that additively share
values. For Circus protocol we need disclose when equal DWE version of conditional disclosure
of secrets, which releases secret if both parties can open other party commitment for the same
value. Due to the fact that opening a commitment leaves message shared between miners makes
DWE very straightforward. Assume that commitment was done as described above, cm is just a
publicly available identifier of the commitment, message m is shared between miners into [[m]],
and a decommitment value dm is generated. Now this decommitment values is additively shared
into two parts dm = dm1 + d
m
2 , and values d
m
1 and d
m
2 are shared between all miners. A party
that wants to open commitment using decommitment value d∗2, shares it, then parties compute
[[m∗]] = [[[dm2 ]]
?
= [[d∗2]]] · [[m]] and publish m∗ to that party.
So P1 has commitment values c
m0 , dm01 and c
m1 , dm11 , and decommitment value d
∗1
2 to some
P2’s commited value. On the other hand, P2 has its commitment values c¯
m0 , d¯1
m0 and c¯m0 , d¯1
m0
and decommitment for P1’s commitment d
∗2
2 . Parties then share all these values between all min-
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ers and proceed with opening four possible triples of decommitment values and obtain commited
messages.
[[
z01
]]
= [
[[
d¯2
m0]] ?= [[d¯2∗1]]] · [[m0]][[
z02
]]
= [[[dm02 ]]
?
=
[[
d¯2
∗2]]] · [[m0]][[
z11
]]
= [
[[
d¯2
m1]] ?= [[d¯2∗1]]] · [[m1]][[
z12
]]
= [[[dm12 ]]
?
=
[[
d¯2
∗2]]] · [[m1]]
[[m]] = [
[[
z01
]] ?
=
[[
z02
]] ∧ [[z01]] 6= 0] · [[z01]]+ [[[z11]] ?= [[z12]] ∧ [[z11]] 6= 0] · [[z11]]
Now, [[m]] is shared value of the output of DWE so miners either publish it to one of the
parties P1 and P2 or to both, depending on intentions of DWE.
7.2 Implementation of COT
One of the most important parts of Circus protocol is COT◦ subprotocol, which implements,
actually, Yao garbled circuit protocol functionality.
Practical part consists of two main problems: implement COT and incorporate COT function-
ality into Sharemind platform. Here we provide an overview of how we solved these problems, for
finer details refer to Appendix A, which includes source code of our solution and documentation
about it.
We have implemented COT in Python 2.7 as a single program that implements functionality
for both sender and receiver parties involved in COT. Despite the fact that this thesis mainly
concerns evaluation of predicates, our solution can be used to evaluate functions with more than
1 bit output.
Boolean circuit description for a specific function is provided with a file that follows following
format, which is best described on an example. Fulladder function takes input bits a, b and curry
bit c and evaluates expression a+ b+ c. Such evaluation produces two-bit result. Consider the
following circuit description for Fulladder function.
g1 : xor a b
g2 : xor g1 c
g3 : and a b
g4 : and c g1
g5 : or g3 g4
adder g2 g5
Elementary boolean functions, for example, and are specified using prefix notation and literal
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name of the function and , so to specify expression a∧ b∧ c one can write andandabc into circuit
description. Supported elementary functions are and, or, xor, eq, not and nand. For every such
elementary function a gate in the final circuit will be created. Each line of the circuit description
file starts with some gate name followed by “:“, where gate name is a single strings that does
not contain spaces. On the right side of such “:“ goes the description of gate functionality. Line
g1 : xor a b, specifies that gate g1 will compute function a ⊕ b. As circuit file parser have
no information what a and b are, it will assume these are names of input wires of the circuit.
Gate description can contain input wires names and names of other gates, so gate g5 : or g3 g4
computes or function of outputs of gates g3 and g4. Additionally, every gate can be specified to
compute more complex boolean functions, for example g1 : or and x y not z is a valid declaration
of a gate. Last line of circuit description file is a space delimited string, where first element is
circuit name and all other elements specify outputs of which gates are considered circuit outputs.
In the example above, circuit name is adder and it outputs two bits: one from gate g2 and one
from gate g5. Such format allows to construct sufficiently complex boolean circuits.
Our solution parses such description file and if a given file does not follow the convention
described above will notify user about it. If circuit file is successfully parsed, we construct a
boolean circuit and can proceed with garbling it.
Implemented procedure for construction of garbled circuit precisely follows the description of
Yao garbled circuit construction given previously in this thesis. Namely, for every wire of the
circuit we generate two random bit-strings 128 bit long. We flip every wire, except output wires
with probability one half. And then encrypt truth-tables of the gates according to flipped wires
values.
We use array encryption scheme with 128− bit AES as pseudorandom generator. Sender then
can send description of garbled circuit and input keys that correspond to his input values to the
receiver.
Receiver needs to get keys that correspond to his input values. To accommodate that, we have
incorporated into our solution some sort of OT protocol that uses RSA encryption mechanism
to encrypt keys. We do not claim that this mechanism is secure, however, it is quite intense
computationally, which is desired property for us to be able be more sure in our performance
results and serves its goal to transfer keys to the receiver. Note, that because of this you will
need freely available rsa-2.0-py2.7.egg Python module to be able to run our solution.
Evaluation of the garbled circuit also follows the description given previously in this thesis.
Receiver evaluate the circuit gate by gate until all output wires will get values. Then receiver
collects those values and outputs them.
Now we describe how to integrate our python solution into Sharemind platform. Sharemind
is a stack based virtual machine. This enables easy integration of several protocols together.
Protocol takes input values from virtual machine stack, performs necessary computation and
puts output values to stack. Additionally, as Sharemind essentially consists of three miner
machines that run the same code, it provides MPI -like syntax and templates for sending and
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receiving messages between miners and for synchronization of miners.
Sharemind platform is not publicly available, so we provide just source files that integrate
with our solution. For more details, refer to Appendix A.
To use Python code from C++ code of the Sharemind one needs to provide link to “Python.h”
header file at compilation time of the Sharemind and link it to a Python dynamic libraries.
For information about how exactly this must be done refer to Python specification. Further
integration with Sharemind is very straightforward, we call Python functions by name and can
transfer information from Python objects to C++ code.
For testing purposes Sharemind provides to our solution just a platform for networking be-
tween miner machines. The setting is then such that first miner is the sender P1, second miner
is the receiver P2. Third miner does not perform computation.
7.2.1 Performance results and notes about implementation
Tests were performed on a single machine with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU M560 @2.67GHz
2.67Ghz processor and 3.83 GB of usable RAM. Python version is 2.7.1, Sharemind version is
2.0.0.
Tests include construction of garbled circuit for function gt(x, y), which outputs 1, if x > y
and 0 otherwise. Both inputs x and y are 32-bit integers. Giver boolean circuit for this function
consists of about 250 gates. Tests were performed as standalone application, when one Python
process performed actions of both parties, and in Sharemind platform, where one of the miners
was playing role of the sender and other of the receiver.
Standalone application. Tests were run by execution of the main program from file expres-
sions.py, which results in performing actions of both parties of the protocol by a single Python
process. Additionally, it provides some profiling information which parts of the program take
most of the time.
Tests included 10 independent runs with randomly generated input values, whose average
time to complete was 4.5 seconds. Almost half of this time were spent in OT protocols to
transfer keys to the receiver and about 20 percent of the time were spent by stretching keys for
array encryption scheme.
Sharemind platform. Tests on Sharemind platform were run using file TestingProtocol.cpp.
We count only time spent in the protocol itself, without any virtual machine or miners initial-
ization time. Similar to standalone application tests, 10 independent runs of evaluation gt(x, y)
were performed. Average time taken by protocol run was about 8.2 seconds. We conclude that
about 4 seconds were spent on networking and serialization of information about circuit. Net-
work consumption were about 200KB per test. This consists mainly of description of garbled
circuit and sender’s and receiver’s keys.
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Notes. First of all, we need to say, that timing results that we produced are low compared to
results of benchmarking solution Shelat and Shen solution [15]. There are two big reasons for that,
first of all we have used a function which is almost twice smaller than the one used by Shelat and
Shen. Additionally, we have benchmarked only a part of the protocol that is secure in malicious
model. The whole protocol will consist of two such evaluations and some additional overhead
for other subprotocols. Despite the fact that efficient implementation of those subprotocols is
possible, as we described above, they still will provide noticeable overhead. Another important
detail to note is that Python is considered about hundred times slower that C++. So without
doubt, performance of the solution created within this thesis can be dramatically improved by
switching to a faster programming language. Additionally, our code is, probably, not as efficient
as possible, so some improvement can be gained there. Moreover, created application implements
a secure protocol, but by no means claims to be secure. There are number of reasons why it is
insecure, for instance, it uses Python’s module pickle for serialization, which leads to security
issues by design.
This is a proof-of-concept piece of software and it needs to be treated as such. However,
performance results that we provided above were stable enough and can be used as rough estimate
of performance of our protocol.
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8 Conclusion and future work
In this thesis we presented an independent proof that Yao garbled circuit protocol is secure
against semi-honest adversary. We proposed a new protocol Circus, based on Yao garbled circuit
protocol, for secure two-party computation problem. We proved that Circus is secure against
malicious adversary in consistency model. We implemented the trickiest of subprotocols for
Circus in Python and integrated this solution with Sharemind platform. Performance results, that
we achieved, give hope, that properly implemented Circus can be compared by speed with the
newest and fastest protocols known before. Obvious continuation of this paper will be improving
performance of the implemented COT protocol and implementation of other subprotocols for
Circus that we left beyond scope of this thesis.
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To˜eva¨a¨rtusskeemide evalueerimise tehnikad turvaliste arvutuste jaoks
Magistrito¨o¨ (30 EAP)
Oleg Sˇelajev
Resu¨mee
To˜eva¨a¨rtusskeemide arvutamine on vo˜imas arvutuste mudel, milles arvutamiseks kasutatakse
to˜eva¨a¨rtustabelitega va¨ravaid, mis realiseerivad elementaarseid loogika funktsioone nagu ja, vo˜i
jne. 1982. aastal pakkus A. A. Yao va¨lja uldise protokolli, kuidas saab kasutada modifitseeritud
skeemi kahe osapoole turvaliseks arvutamiseks. See sai nimeks Yao kru¨pteeritud arvutusskeem.
Kahe osapoole vahel turvalise arvutamise u¨lesanne koosneb sellest, et kaks osapoolt tahavad
arvutada funktsiooni privaatsete sisenditega nii, et kumbki osapool ei saa teada, milline oli teise
osapoole sisend.
Yao kru¨pteeritud arvutusskeem on turvaline pool-ausas mudelis, kus ru¨ndaja ka¨itub protokolli
ja¨rgi ning lihtsalt uurib saadud andmeid vastasosapoole sisendi leidmiseks. Juhul, kui ru¨ndaja
ei ja¨rgi protokolli, saab ta turvalisust rikkuda ja informatsiooni sisendi kohta leida. Viimase
va¨ltimiseks on leiutatud erinevaid tehnikaid, mis tavaliselt kasutavad mitme Yao kru¨pteeritud
arvutusskeemi korraga.
Antud to¨o¨ po˜hitulemus on Yao kru¨pteeritud arvutusskeemi protokollil po˜hineva Circus pro-
tokolli kirjeldus ning to˜estus, et ta on turvaline konsistentses mudelis. Konsistentses mudelis
arvutamisel kas mo˜lemad osapooled saavad korrektse tulemuse ja nende sisendid ja¨a¨vad privaat-
seteks vo˜i aus osapool saab teada, et teine osapool ei ka¨itunud protokolli ja¨rgi.
To¨o¨s esitatakse range to˜estus, et Yao kru¨pteeritud arvutusskeem on turvaline pool-ausas
mudelis ning kirjeldatakse ko˜ik vajalikud alamprotokollid Circus protokolli koostamiseks. Lisaks
to˜estatakse antud to¨o¨s Circus protokolli turvalisuse omadused ja nende olemasolu jaoks vajalikud
eeldused. Teoreetiliselt ei ole Circus protokoll aeglasem, kui ko˜ige paremad protokollid kahe
osapoole vahel turvalise arvutamise puhul, kus u¨ks osapool on kuritahtlik.
Praktilises osas luuakse Yao kru¨pteeritud arvutusskeemi implementatsioon, mis vo˜ib olla
aluseks Circus protokolli realisatsiooni jaoks. Vaatamata sellele, et to¨o¨ raames luuakse kontsept-
siooni to˜estav rakendus, siis selle implementatsiooni jo˜udlustestid na¨itavad, et Circus protokoll
vo˜ib olla to˜esti kiirem, kui olemasolevad lahendused. Lisaks luuakse Sharemind platvormi
moodul, mille abil saab integreerida kru¨pteeritud skeemide arvutamise protokolli Sharemindiga.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Source code for experimental part of this work is available from a CD attached to a hard copy of
this thesis. The CD contains “README” file, which explains how to treat this piece of software.
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